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The African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Quasi-Constructivism, and the Possibility of Peacebuilding
within African States

OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR
York University, Toronto, Canada

ABSTRACT This article examines the influence that IHIs (such as the African System on
Human and Peoples’ Rights) can exert within states, with the facilitative work of local
popular forces, and relates that to the possibility of valuable IHI contributions to
peacebuilding within deeply fragmented African states. Of all the existing approaches
to the study of IHIs, constructivism comes the closest to accounting for the highly
significant incidences of IHI-fostered (and popular forces-facilitated) ‘correspondence’
that occurs outside the ‘compliance radar’. In this sense the article is a contribution
to the growing constructivist human rights and institutional literature sets. In particular
the article explores the brighter possibilities for peacebuilding thinking and practice
that are revealed by a broader and less conventional analysis of the African
system’s continuing engagement with elements of the local popular forces that operate
within Nigeria.

Do international human rights institutions (IHIs) matter to local popular forces that wage
domestic social justice and legitimate governance struggles around the world? Can IHIs
contribute meaningfully to such struggles for social justice and legitimate governance
within states? Do particular IHIs matter particularly in particular places? If so, why,
when, and how do such IHIs matter? Aside from generally vain attempts at commanding
obedience and very limited successes at cajoling compliance, are there other significant
ways in which IHIs can matter to such local struggles? Apart from acting like ‘imperial’
institutions that enforce or cajole state compliance, how else – in what other non-imperial
ways – can and do IHIs contribute meaningfully to such local struggles? Aside from doing
something for the local popular forces that wage such struggles, what meaningful things
can such local popular forces do with IHIs within their own countries? How can these

local popular forces (as agents) deploy and harness the norms and creative spaces made
available to them, in part at least, through the efforts of relevant IHIs? These are the
broader questions that frame the more specific concerns that are dealt with in this article.
On a broad level, the article is an attempt to relate insights derived from my more
general work on the re-orientation of the conventional optics through which the influence
that IHIs (such as the African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights1) can with
the facilitative work of local popular forces exert within states, is observed, to the
question of the possibility of valuable IHI contributions to peacebuilding within deeply
fragmented African states. More specifically, the article attempts at a minimum
to expose the brighter possibilities for peacebuilding thinking and practice that are
revealed by a broader and less conventional analysis of the African system’s
continuing engagement with elements of the local popular forces that operate within
Nigeria.
Broadly speaking, two sets of arguments are advanced in this article. The first set of
arguments is that: (1) much of the evidence gathered as part of my broader research
project tends to show that the African system has exerted significant, though modest,
‘constructivist’ influence within Nigeria’s domestic governance institutions and on its
civil society (influence of the kind that is explained, at least partly, by the concept of
‘correspondence’)2; (2) the process of ‘trans-judicial communication’,3 through which
the exertion of such significant influence by the African system was made possible, was
facilitated in key ways by the networks of popular forces, including human rights
NGOs, that operate within Nigeria; (3) if this is so, then the demonstrated capacity of
the African system to make a significant contribution to the enhancement of a culture
of constraint within this particular state – to contribute significantly to the progressive

transformation in the self-understandings, senses of appropriateness, and conceptions of
self-interest held by key actors and institutions within Nigeria – ought to be more
vigorously harnessed within and without that country in order to help address some of
the structural problems that contribute to the generation of conflicts, and thus pose
serious peacebuilding problems, in many such states. The obvious implication is that
peacebuilding thinking and action can be deepened and strengthened when IHIs and the
virtual alliances that they often form with local popular forces (and other agents) are
taken seriously.
The second such argument is implied. It is what I style the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’: the
demonstrable capacity of the African system to exert significant, albeit modest, influence
within Nigeria, with important implications for the orientation and efficacy of the very
analytical optics through which many dominant ‘schools’4 of institutional thought have
sought to assess and understand the possible domestic effects of IHIs.
However, as a prelude to the detailed articulation of these two broad arguments, a transdisciplinary analysis will be undertaken of the various conventional ways in which
international institutions in general, IHIs, and the African system itself, have been
imagined in the relevant bodies of literature. Here, our method of analysis will be to
examine closely the approach of each of the various ‘schools’ of international
institutional theory to the study and assessment of IHIs.
My own assessment of these ‘schools’ and their approaches indicates that most of them
have tended to subscribe to a set of conventional conceptions and accounts regarding the
character and effects of IHIs in general, and the African system in particular. These
conventional conceptions have tended to be overly focused on the capacity of such IHIs
to directly coerce or cajole the compliance of state actors – an optic that is at its

weakest ‘relentlessly and bluntly Austinian’ in nature,5 and which is at its best moment
grounded in a vision of the ideal IHI as the generator of the kind of adherence
that Thomas Franck has, in another context, referred to as ‘voluntary compliance-pull’.6
In either case, state ‘compliance’ – making states ‘behave’ in some direct way – has
been the crucial objective, the consuming concern.7 It is as a result of their
compliancecentrism that most conventional approaches to the study of IHIs have almost
always missed, or failed to adequately account for, the many other valuable and
varied ways in which IHIs can and do foster modest yet significant levels of
‘correspondence’ between their norms/goals/decisions (on the one hand) and the
thinking/action of key actors and institutions within some states. Put differently, it is as a
result of their compliancecentric orientation that these ‘schools’ have generally failed
to account for and theorise the modest but no less significant levels of
‘constructivist’ influence that IHIs have often fostered within the domestic governance
institutions and civil societies of state actors – what I have otherwise styled
‘correspondence’. Consequently, as will be shown, most of these conventional
approaches have also failed to account for, or explain adequately, the demonstrable
capacity of the African system (seen as a weak IHI) to exert significant influence
within Nigeria (a country that was, during the relevant period, viewed as a dictatorial
state), while utilising the mediating activism of local popular forces – what I have
styled the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’. It is urged that of all the existing approaches to the
study of IHIs, constructivism, especially that strain of constructivism that I refer to as
quasi-constructivism, comes the closest to accounting for the highly significant
incidences of IHI-fostered (and popular forces-facilitated) ‘correspondence’ that occurs
outside the ‘compliance radar’. It is also this approach that best explains the

‘ACHPR phenomenon’. In this sense the article is a contribution to the growing
constructivist human rights and institutional literature sets.
To develop these arguments, the organisation of the article is as follows. In the next
section I examine, somewhat briefly, the conventional conceptions of the nature and
effect of IHIs, and the blind spots that these conventional approaches tend to share.
In the following section, I examine the question of the conventional conceptions of
the African system, and the blind spots that they tend to exhibit. Next I attempt to
demonstrate the proposition that the African system has exerted modest yet very
significant influence within Nigeria, and buttress my arguments with a few examples
from other African jurisdictions. Then I make a case for the centring of the generation
of correspondence (and the de-centring of measurement of compliance) as the primary
basis for evaluating the domestic effects that IHIs have had. I also explain in some
detail the basis for the inability of most conventional approaches to the study of IHIs
either to account for and theorise the generation of correspondence, or to explain
adequately the occurrence of the ACHPR phenomenon. I also note that this failure has
important implications for the holism and sufficiency of these analytic optics. In the
next section I discuss the relationships among three phenomena: the capacity of
the African system to exert modest but significant kinds of influence within Nigeria; the
structural afflictions of the contemporary African state; and the question of peacebuilding
within such deeply fragmented states. The main point that is made in this section is that if
the African system has had a significant impact within a relatively powerful African state,
during a period in which that state was widely regarded as ruled by dictatorial regimes,
then it seems reasonable to suggest that the African system’s capacity to affect domestic
politics within this state could, in some cases, be harnessed, improved and pressed into

the service of those peacebuilders who are minded to address effectively the structural
afflictions of many African states. For after all, should not a good chunk of the
peacebuilding effort in Africa be about removing or ameliorating the root causes of
violence and offering credible alternatives to armed conflicts as a means of seeking
political power and relevance?8 This reading of the concept of peacebuilding is in
keeping with the work of Johan Galtung who has been credited with introducing that
term into the contemporary social science lexicon.9 In the concluding section I offer
some suggestions for the kind of concrete reforms that must occur if Africans are to reap
the peace dividends that may accrue from effective peacebuilding on that continent. I
also reflect on the implications of these conclusions for a future research agenda. At
the outset, it is important to note that as Samuel Barnes has recently stated, modesty is
always in order in social science scholarship.10 As such, I am in complete agreement
with him that in this area of scholarship:
Little is known with certainty; some evident results have limited applicability; and often there is
no compelling evidence as to what works and what does not.11

As such, the claims that I make in this article are, while significant in my view,
necessarily modest in nature. I do not purport to settle any of the pertinent debates,
only to open up possibilities that might add to and enhance pre-existing thinking and
approaches to the study of IHIs. In this sense are my conclusions offered merely as
guides for future thought and action in this area.

Conventional Conceptions of IHIs
Conventional analyses of the nature and relevance of international institutions (in general)

may be organised in a number of different ways. In a now famous and widely cited paper,
Robert Keohane organised these analyses into two major strands, the one mostly
rationalist and the other largely reflective or cognitive.12 In his view, although realism
and neo-realism are the most avowedly rationalist of all the ‘schools’ that constitute
the two strands of analysis, neo-liberalism and liberalism also subscribe to the rationalist
approach.13 Despite their internal differences, rationalists share a commitment to the
conceptualisation of international institutions and foreign policies as outcomes of
calculations of advantage made by states.14 They are sceptical of reflectivist approaches,
(that emphasise the role of ideas, norms and knowledge) charging that while norms, ideas
and knowledge can each play a role in international cooperation, and thus in understanding
the nature and behaviour of international institutions, international cooperation can be
explained without reference to such constructs.15 The reflective (or critical) approaches
include the various strands of cognitivism: such as the work of constructivists like Ernst
Haas, Peter Haas, Martha Finnemore, John Gerard Ruggie, Frederich Kratochwil and
Alexander Wendt,16 the work of postmodernists such as R.B.J. Walker and Richard
Ashley,17 the work of feminists such as Peterson, Mazey and Sylvester,18 and the work
of neo-marxians such as Cox and Gill.19 Despite their many differences, these reflective
approaches share a commitment to a stress on ideas, norms and knowledge, as explanatory
factors.20 They are critical of rationalist approaches that they view as tending to ignore, or
at best trivialise, the role of norms, ideas and knowledge in the production of the identities
or self-understandings, and interests or preferences, of states – phenomena that rationalists
treat as non-theorised ‘initial conditions’.21 In the view of reflectivist scholars, such
identities and interests are not ‘exogenously given’.22
While largely supportable, this rationalist/reflectivist typology may still be too broad for

the purposes of this article. Other typologies are in fact possible. For instance, Hasenclever,
Mayer and Rittberger have adopted a different typology, classifying these conventional
analyses into realist, neo-liberal and cognitivist approaches. They have also described
these same three ‘schools’ in terms of power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based
approaches to the study of international institutions.23 I shall deal with them under the
discrete headings: realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, republican liberalism, constructivism,
and a strain of constructivist thinking that I will refer to as ‘quasi-constructivism’.
While an extensive exposition of the nature or work of each of these ‘schools’ is in itself
beyond the focus of this article, it is appropriate to note, albeit briefly, their various
relationships to ‘institutionalism’ (the view that institutions matter in international affairs).24
This is important because as Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood have recently noted,
‘institutionalism’ (the view that institutions fundamentally matter) is now dominant in
the North American academe.25 While none of the relevant schools denies institutions any
impact whatsoever, realists and neo-realists (who emphasise ‘relative power’ as the most
important influence on international cooperation) are widely acknowledged to be the least
institutionalist of all of them.26 Neo-liberals, republican liberals, constructivists and
quasi-constructivists are all avowedly institutionalist, but disagree as to the most adequate
explanatory approach to, and the most fundamental influence on, the formation, functioning
and effects of IHIs.27 Neo-liberals emphasise ‘the effects of the institutionalised contractual
environment’.28 Republican liberals tend to emphasise the level of convergence of national
preferences reflecting the demands of dominant domestic groups.29 Constructivists
emphasise the importance of ideas, knowledge and norms in explaining the creation,
behaviour and effects of institutions.30 Quasi-constructivists are constructivists but they
attempt to reconcile constructivism with rationalistic approaches, insisting that the relevant

actors make detailed ‘ends-means calculations’.31
However, most of these schools are characterised by a number of problematic features
that orient them in ways that generate some highly consequential blind spots regarding
their view of institutional or IHI effects within states. To varying extents realism,
neorealism, neo-liberalism and even one or two strains of constructivism, have been
overly state centric, and thus relatively neglectful of domestic politics and sub-state
actors.32 They have thus focused too steadfastly and steadily on the international plane.
But this kind of state centrism has not been characteristic of the work of most republican
liberals, constructivists, and quasi-constructivists. The work of scholars like Audie Klotz,
Kathryn Sikkink, Andrew Moravcsik, and Margaret Keck, Thomas Risse and
Stephen Ropp, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes,
Eyal Benvenisti, and Ann-Marie Clark have followed the earlier work done by Keohane
and Nye, in establishing sub-state analysis as an important part of the study of
international politics and institutions.33
Far too many of these conventional approaches have also been far too positivistic. The
notable relative exception to this general trend has been the work of some constructivists
and ‘cognitivist’ scholars.34 However, as Richard Ashley has admitted, all social science
aspiring to theory has had a positivist dimension.35 The point though is that some of these
conventional approaches to the study of IHIs have been so positivistic in their assumptions
as to be manifestly incapable of capturing those valuable and significant international
institutional effects that occur within states but which are not easily captured by strictly
positivistic methods.36
Virtually all of these approaches have also been characterised by compliance-centrism
(of either the enforcement-based kind or the voluntary compliance-based type). According

to the enforcement-based sub-approach, while state compliance is the most important test
of institutional value, rarely can an international norm or institution exert significant
influence or generate state compliance without being enforced or backed by sanction.
I agree with Brunnee and Toope who have suggested that many social scientists and
lawyers tend to view international society, norms, law and institutions through the
prism of domestic legal systems, and thus find these international entities and prescriptions
to be comparatively underdeveloped and wanting in terms of not ‘looking like’ domestic
institutions such as courts that are able to coerce compliance.37 Realists (like Mearsheimer
and Watson) who stress relative material power tend to be the most enforcement-centred,
while those international lawyers (such as Franck, Brunnee, Toope), constructivists (Ruggie,
Haas, Kratochwil) and quasi-constructivists (Sikkink, Finnemore, Keck) who stress the
power of ideas, knowledge and norms are perhaps some of the least enforcement-centred.
Enforcement-centrism is indeed still rife in the relevant literature. For instance, even
respected human rights scholar, Henry Steiner, has declared, somewhat understandably,
that: ‘Institutions make rights more effective by threatening or taking actions that may
lead a state to comply. Institutions with real power cut to the bone of sovereignty’.38 As
Shand Watson has put it: ‘What human rights advocates are seeking is a supranational
order of the hierarchical, coercive type prevalent in domestic systems to act as a check
on governmental malfeasance’.39
The principal organising idea for the voluntary compliance-based sub-approach is that
since the consistent, routine and sustained enforcement of international norms and
institutional decisions is all but a pipe dream, international lawyers and international
relations scholars ought to abandon the vain hope of achieving international normative
or institutional effectiveness mainly via enforcement. Instead, much more attention

should be devoted to (1) describing the processes through which the voluntary compliance
of states is routinely secured in the real world, and (2) finding and describing ways of
enhancing the prospects that states will comply voluntarily with their international
normative or institutional obligations.40 Voluntary compliance-based approaches are as
ubiquitous in the literature as Enforcement-centred approaches but only a few examples
will suffice. For example, Helfer and Slaughter have declared that: ‘Supplementing and
surrounding this core of potential coercion, however, is the power of legitimacy: a
court’s ability to command acceptance and support from the community so as to render
force unnecessary’.41 Similarly, Donnelly’s favourable assessment of the European
human rights system is hinged on the demonstrated capacity of that system to generate
mostly non-coerced or voluntary compliance.42 It is also on this basis that he returned a
much less favourable assessment of the Inter-American human rights system.43 In a
similar way, Dominic McGoldrick’s assessment of the individual petition and state
reporting mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Committee is framed by the voluntary
compliance sub-approach.44 It seeks to measure how much non-coerced compliance
with the norms or goals of the two mechanisms has been registered.45
Unfortunately, however, compliance centric approaches, even when based on the
voluntary compliance sub-approach (the bulk of the literature), share a blind spot.
These approaches fail to capture, or capture adequately, the full picture of the various
significant ways in which international norms and institutions may exert significant
influence within states and their domestic institutions. Much of the evidence of such
influence lies well beyond the compliance model’s ‘radar screen’. I have in mind such
phenomena as the ability of such institutions to help create appreciable and significant
levels of ‘correspondence’ without necessarily generating a high level of direct

compliance (whether voluntarily or via enforcement). I will offer evidence of this
kind of post-compliance phenomena in the next part of this article.
Here again, of all the schools of thought, the constructivists, especially their
quasiconstructivist strain, come the closest in my view to offering a relatively more
adequate explanation for the domestic effects that IHIs can exert beyond the
compliance-centred optic. Quasi-constructivists accept the notion so fundamental to
constructivism that not only are ideas, knowledge and norms powerful, they play a
fundamental role in international cooperation.46 Like other kinds of constructivists, they
stress the ‘power’ of norms and institutions, and affirm that material factors are not
the only factors that shape international politics.47 For instance, Sikkink has correctly
stressed the shared values or principled ideas that primarily drives international ‘issuenetworks’ working to bring about change within domestic orders (via transformation of
logics of appropriateness).48 They want, as well, to take constructivism a step further by
iterating and explaining exactly how ideas and norms can have an impact on
international politics. They also seek to specify the conditions under which norms and
ideas can transform prevalent thinking and practices within states.49
Additionally, quasi-constructionists have also adopted the ‘disaggregated state’ model
analytical optic (as opposed to the ‘unitary state actor’ model that had been previously
favoured in the literature). This conceptual posture has enabled them to pay a great
deal of attention to the critical roles that are played by non-state and sub-state actors in
the success of many international institutions.50 These non-state actors include those
that have been styled ‘principled issue-networks’ (PINs), ‘advocacy networks’ (ADNs)
and ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TANs).51 Sikkink has noted how these actors/
networks help spur action at every stage of the process of generating correspondence

between IHI norms/goals and domestic understandings and practices.52
As importantly, they have also used elements of the rationalist approach. For example,
they have applied insights regarding the rational ‘ends-means’ calculations that Finnemore
and Sikkink regard as important to the strategies and operations of the relevant subnational
and state actors involved in the promotion of the goals and norms of IHIs, as such
actors facilitate a process that these scholars have referred to as ‘strategic social
construction’.53 Risse and Sikkink have also used a kind of rationalistic analysis to
supplement their largely ‘liberal’ constructivist account of the processes through which
IHI norms are dynamically socialised into domestic practices.54 So have Keck and
Sikkink who, even while steeped in the constructivist language of norms, social relations
and inter-subjective understandings, have used the rationalist language of constraints,
strategies, institutions and rules.55 To these scholars, the TANS that can often facilitate
IHI effectiveness are simultaneously ‘principled’ and ‘strategic’ actors.56 What is more,
Keck and Sikkink do admit that TANs often employ ‘coercive’ strategies (such as
armtwisting and the encouragement of sanctions) against a target state.57
In the end, most quasi-constructivists will agree with Sikkink’s theory of IHI
effectiveness and worth. According to her:
The [International Issue] networks [made up of private western charities, local and
international NGOs and IHIs] were influential within states because they contributed to a
reformulation in the understandings of national interest [and thus of ‘human rights discourse’]
at times when traditional understandings of sovereignty and national interest were called into
question by changing global events.58

Thus, Quasi-constructivists see clearly the possibility of the occurrence of
‘correspondence’ between IHI norms/goals and domestic socio-political and legal

change of a kind that is not easily subsumed within the ‘compliance-based’ analytical
optic; of the kind that Makau Mutua did envisage in his brilliant review of Shand
Watson’s book on IHIs; and of the kind that Peter Burns and the present writer had
discussed in an earlier paper.59 Yet, even the highly developed (and generally
convincing) theoretical framework that has been developed by the quasi-constructivists
does not seem to explain fully the occurrence of what I have styled the ‘ACHPR
phenomenon’. I will return to this last point more fully in a later section of this
article, but will now conclude the present section by briefly discussing the nature of
the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ and offering a relatively brief insight as to why it poses
a problem for existing conceptual frameworks for understanding the effects that IHIs
can exert within states.

The ‘ACHPR Phenomenon’ as a Problem for Conventional IHI Thoeries:
A Brief Insight
The ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ stands for the level of generally non-coerced and non-cajoled
influence, facilitated by local popular forces, that the African system has exerted within
Nigeria – a level of influence that, over time, contributed significantly to a modest, if
palpable, transformation in the dominant ‘self-understandings’, senses of
‘appropriate’ governmental behaviour, and conceptions of ‘national interest’, that
were held by key subnational actors and institutions during a period in which that country
was governed (for 12 of 14 years) by dictatorial military regimes, and at a time when it
was widely acknowledged to be one of the two most powerful African states.
The evidence for the existence and significance of this phenomenon will be supplied

later in this article, but it is important, in conclusion of the present section, to offer a
brief preview of the reasons why this ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ poses a significant
problem for most pre-existing theories of IHIs.
As has already been discussed, realism and neo-liberalism are the least explanatory
with respect to those important domestic effects of IHIs (like the ACHPR phenomenon)
that occur beyond the compliance-centred radar. This point will not therefore be reiterated
here. However, since the other ‘schools’ come much closer to offering an adequate
explanation of the range of domestic influence exertable by IHIs well beyond the
compliance-centred optic, a brief exposition of their own inadequacy as explanatory
theoretical approaches, in the present respect, will now be offered.
The major reason why the republican liberals cannot adequately explain the ACHPR
phenomenon is that that theory (at least as ably advanced by Andrew Moravcsik) seems to
have confi d itself to explaining the impact that IHIs can have within already (if newly/
weakly) democratised states, and as such does not really have any explanation for signifi
IHI impact within dictatorships. This theoretical school has also focused on attempting to
‘measure’ the extent of state compliance with IHI ‘edicts’ as the chief indicator of IHI value.
Mainstream constructivism (that is, other constructivists save the quasi-constructivists)
comes very close to offering a convincing explanation of this phenomenon. However,
the now-waning historical tendency of some (not all) adherents of that school to treat
states as unitary actors has meant that some members of this school have too often not
paid sufficient attention to the role that non-state actors such as local popular forces can
play, and have often played, in ensuring IHI effectiveness. This posture can be problematic
in the context of attempts to explain a process via which an IHI (such as the African system)
that is widely viewed as relatively ‘weak’ has exerted a modest but significant level of

t

influence on a number of domestic governance institutions within the borders of a
relatively powerful state actor such as Nigeria, largely in partnership with various substate actors. Nevertheless, despite this historical weakness in the work of a few adherents
of the mainstream constructivist school, the explanation for the ACHPR phenomenon
that I offer in this article is still largely steeped in the broadly constructivist idiom or
framework.
Even though quasi-constructivism (which is still a broadly constructivist theoretical
position) more adequately explains the ‘ACHPR Phenomenon’, this theoretical approach
is still not totally explanatory of the extant phenomenon. While this is not the place to
go into this matter in any detail (as this will be done later), it will suffice to mention in
brief some of the major obstacles that militate against a completely quasi-constructivist
explanation of that phenomenon. In general, existing quasi-constructivist theories:

1. Tend to over-state the significance of the leadership of the ‘issue networks’ or
‘advocacy networks’ (that often serve as the engines that drive the processes
through which IHIs exert domestic influence) by foreign (‘international’) as
opposed to local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). While they regard local
NGOs as important, they place far too much emphasis on what foreign agents and
institutions can do for local NGOs as opposed to what local human rights NGO
and other popular forces (as agents) can do with IHIs and other non-local
institutions and actors. This posture is not explanatory in the Nigerian case. While
foreign agents such as foreign charities have played a highly significant role, that role
has not been the most crucial or critical element of the local struggle. There is little or
no evidence, for instance, to suggest that more money was pumped into Nigerian

human rights NGOs by foreign charities than was pumped into states that were not as
markedly affected by the relevant human rights networks and institutions. The more
critical factor seems to relate to the creativity and courage of some of the local
popular forces that operate in Nigeria.
2. Tend to overstate the role that can be, and has been, played by coercive pressure in
bringing about a transformation in the thinking and practices of states that are
viewed as recalcitrant. This is not explanatory in the Nigerian case. While pressure
can and often does achieve some results in such cases, coercion in itself has not
been particularly critical in the Nigerian case. During the relevant period, very little
real coercive pressure was put on Nigeria’s various military regimes by external
forces. Such coercion as was exerted was limited to relatively soft sanctions as the
denials of visa to some officials sometimes and closure of one or two diplomatic
missions. As such, the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ developed, and modest transformations
occurred, within Nigeria, without a significant amount of coercive pressure being
mounted against the rulers of that country.

Following a detailed consideration, in a later section, of the evidence for the existence
and significance of the ACHPR phenomenon, a fuller discussion of the above questions
will be offered. It is important at this juncture, however, to turn to a brief discussion of
the nature of the conventional conceptions of the African system – the IHI that stands
closely examined as our case study.

Conventional Conceptions of the African System
The literature on the African system is riddled with the sorts of blind spots already

discussed above as the more general institutions or IHI literature sets.60 The pre-dominant
attitude in the literature has been to apply either the domestic or the European analogy to
the system and then to declare, often too quickly, that the system is the ‘least developed or
effective . . . the most controversial of the three established regional human rights regimes
involve African states [that is, the African system]’.61 This attitude to the system is rather
rampant in the literature, and while it may have been somewhat justified, say, ten years
ago, viewed from the evidence available today, it is hardly an unassailable position.62
Still, the conventional consensus has been that the system is ‘weak and ineffectual’. The
Charter, the Commission, and even the proposed (and not yet operational) Court, have all
been assessed as ‘weak and ineffectual’ or likely to be ‘weak and ineffectual’.63 It is one
thing to describe this system as ‘weak’, but another to so easily and quickly dismiss it as
‘ineffectual’. To dismiss it as such today would, as Chidi Odinkalu has put it, be ‘ill
informed, ignorant, or both’.64 Some of these rapid and harsh dismissals of the African
system can even be justifiably accused of being clouded by a taint of ‘afro-pessimism’.65
The justification for this last assertion will be clear from the evidence adduced in the next
section of the article – evidence that is even then still not exhaustive of the available
evidence regarding the full extent of the valuable, if clearly modest, contributions that
the African system has made and can make to both domestic and international politics
in Africa. The point is not of course that that system is still not confronted with a lot of
challenges and problems. The point is that, while it has never been, should never be,
and perhaps will never become, an Austinian-style sovereign, given the particularly
difficult circumstances in which it has had to function, the system has tended to discharge
itself quite creditably.
Nevertheless, conventional assessments of the African system have also tended to

imagine it as some kind of potential panacea, often chiding it for not having succeeded
in eliminating Africa’s human rights problems.66 These assessments often give the
impression that this is what the mandate of the system is, or could be. Surely, that is an
unrealistic expectation of any international institution. In this connection, Rachael
Murray has correctly complained of the tendency in the literature to portray the as yet
non-operational African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (a potential component of
the system) as the panacea for the human rights problems that plague many African
states.67
These conventional approaches have also tended to view the textual or organisational
reform of the system as the key to its effectiveness or significance. While textual or
organisational reform is not unimportant, to focus on it as the key to the system’s
effectiveness is, for the most part, misguided. That kind of approach ignores increasing
evidence that such institutions are able to exert influence not as much because of how they
are organised or what their enabling texts say per se, but much more because of how they
read the text or engage with key state and sub-state actors, for example, via processes
of trans-judicial communication, facilitated by local popular forces, that will be
discussed in the next section. Organisational reform may enhance this process of
communication but is hardly ever the key factor.68 So an IHI or other institution
with an ideal text and an ideal organisational structure may fail to become
influential within states, while one with a less than ideal text or organisational
structure may become extremely influential. These conventional understandings of the
African system have also tended to be compliance-centred in orientation (in either the
enforcement-based or voluntary-based senses). As such, these understandings have too
often missed the existence and significance of those forms of IHI fostered

‘correspondence’ that lie beyond the compliance-oriented ‘radar’. Similarly,
adherents of that position have almost always remained incognizant of the occurrence
and significance of the ACHPR phenomenon. The enforcement-centrism of much of the
relevant literature is clearly evident in the many otherwise valid critical reviews that the
system has received – the system has been chided time and time again for its apparent
inability to ‘enforce’ its decisions.69 The voluntary compliance-centrism of much of
the same body of literature is evinced by the tendency to criticise the system for
the low rate of direct state compliance with its decisions.70 While the achievement of a
very high level of direct voluntary compliance with the system’s decisions by state
actors is a laudable ambition, it is not at all clear why that index should constitute the
only or key measure of the system’s significance and value. What is clear though is that
in the absence of adequate recognition of the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ or of the possibility
of ‘correspondence without direct compliance’, then direct compliance becomes the only
way of assessing the system’s worth and value. Yet, in such a case, only a partial
picture of the range of effects that the system can exert within states is revealed.
In the following section, I will offer some of the evidence that is currently available
regarding the existence of the kinds of valuable ‘correspondence’ (without compliance
as such) that has been referred to earlier in the article, as well as disclose some of the
evidence that grounds what I have styled the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’. Following that, I
will make a case for the centring of the study of (IHI induced and popular forcesfacilitated) ‘correspondence’. This paradigm shift must occur if observers of IHIs
are to better account for the domestic effects that are attributable in some way to the
existence and functioning of IHIs. Implied in this argument is the concomitant
conviction that IHIs like the African system can under certain conditions contribute

meaningfully to the domestic social justice struggles that rage within states, and that they
can do so most effectively when they are deployed in creative ways by local popular
forces within the domestic governance institutions of state actors. Also implied in the
arguments is that, even with all their limitations, IHIs can often make meaningful
contributions to the peacebuilding efforts of many a deeply fragmented society.

The Impact of the African System within Nigeria (1987 – 2001)
It would be idle to claim that the commission has acquired or will ever command the
spontaneity of compliance enjoyed by the Oracle of Delphi. However, any temptation to
dismiss it as a worthless institution today must be regarded as premature, ill-informed, or
both.71

Observed through this more holistic optic, the African system appears to have exerted a
modest yet significant level of influence within at least one African state – Nigeria.
Modest as it appears, this feat is still quite remarkable given the fact that Nigeria was
for all but two of the 14 years (1987 – 2001) under consideration governed by military
regimes that were largely dictatorial. In any case, however modest its domestic effects
have been, the African system’s impact within a state that has been governed in a
largely dictatorial manner flies in the face of almost every prediction regarding the
likely locations of the system’s impact. For instance, writing in 1992, Claude Welch, a
foremost observer of the system, was convinced that: ‘The impact [of the system] likely
will be felt mostly in states which have leaders who begrudgingly recognize human
rights and whose efforts can be encouraged by the Banjul Charter’s existence’.72
Welch’s prediction was clearly that the African system would not be able to exert a
significant level of influence within a country that was, during the relevant period,

governed by a dictatorial military regime. The point that is being made here is that this
prediction has not been borne out by the evidence that is now available.
As interesting is the fact that this modest but significant feat was accomplished in close
‘alliance’ with the many local popular forces, especially certain human rights
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), who acted as the go-betweens or intelligent
transmission-lines between the African system (on the one hand) and various institutions
and actors within Nigeria – such as the courts, the executive, the legislature, sub-state
groups, and individuals (on the other hand). In this process of trans-judicial
communication, Nigerian NGOs played the role of brainy relays that did not merely
transmit normative energy and values, but also contributed to the development and
strengthening of both the Nigerian human rights regime and the African system itself. Here
I am reminded of Kathryn Sikkink’s insight regarding the ways in which our
appreciation of the workings of international regimes (such as IHIs) is immediately
deepened and expanded when once we factor in ‘the role of nongovernmental actors
[and networks] in developing norms and helping to create, monitor, and strengthen
some regimes’.73 This article is thus situated within the more general international
law/international relations literature that emphasises the value of norms, ideas and
knowledge in shaping the identity, thinking and behaviour of both state actors and the
dominant actors within their domestic governance institutions, and emphasises as well the
roles of non-state actors in the construction and dissemination of such norms, ideas
and knowledge. In this sense are the arguments made here broadly ‘constructivist’ in
nature.
In what follows of this section of the article, I will discuss some of the evidence that
supports these contentions. It includes a sample of the available evidence regarding the

ways in which a network of popular forces (in which human rights NGOs were central)
has greatly facilitated the impact that the African system has had within Nigeria.74 This
body of evidence tends to support my call for a shift toward the adoption of a more holistic
paradigm for assessing IHIs. It tends to support my thesis that regardless of how IHIs
perform against the conventional tests of effectiveness, these institutions can still help
make a difference within states when used or deployed creatively at local levels by
interested local agents such as the network of popular forces (including human rights
NGOs) that I have referred to already. Here are a number of illustrations of the influence
that the African system has had within the judicial, executive, legislative arms of
government in Nigeria, as well as of its influence on the course of popular activism in
that country.

The African System’s Influence on Judicial Reasoning and Action in Nigeria
The significance of the modest influence that the African system has exerted on judicial
thinking and action within Nigeria is exemplified by the two decisions that are discussed
below.

The Zamani Lekwot Case:75 In 1993, seven prominent leaders of the Kataf ethnic
minority in the Northern Nigerian State of Kaduna were arrested, detained, tried before
a military tribunal headed by Justice Benedict Okadigbo,76 convicted and sentenced to
death. These persons were Major-General Zamani Lekwot, James Atomic Kude,
Yohanna Karau Kibori, Marcus Mamman, Yahaya Duniya, Julius Sarki Zamman Dabo
and Iliya Maza. Upon a communication filed on their behalf by the Constitutional
Rights Project (CRP), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights indicated

interim measures to the effect that the Nigerian military government should suspend the
implementation of the sentence pending the outcome of the matter. This indication of
interim measures was formally non-binding on the Nigerian military government. The
Nigerian military government was duly notified of the African Commission’s decision
to indicate interim measures. This interim decision was also given extremely wide local
publicity by the CRP and its allies in the mass media. The CRP also instituted an action
at the Lagos High Court in Nigeria asking the court to compel the Nigerian Military
government to respect the African Commission’s request that the planned executions be
stayed. In technical legal terms, the CRP asked for an interlocutory injunction restraining
the Nigerian military government from executing the seven convicted persons pending the
determination of their communication before the African Commission. The
communication was itself based on the rights that had been guaranteed to them under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.77 The court per Onalaja, J. (as
he then was) granted the application and dismissed the government’s objections that
the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. It held that it was necessary to grant
the injunction in order to preserve the subject matter of the communication before the
Commission, that is, the lives of the convicted persons. Without this injunction, the
court reasoned, the government could go ahead and execute them thereby rendering the
anticipated decision of the Commission nugatory. The government did not execute the
convicted persons. At the conclusion of the parallel matter before the African Commission
in 1996, the Commission found grave violations of the due process guarantees of the
Charter. It also requested the Nigerian Military government to release the convicted
persons from prison. They eventually regained their freedom in 1996.
It is important to note here that the injunction granted to the CRP suspending the

executions would not have been possible under Nigerian law had the CRP not deployed
the Charter and the Commission as a major part of its struggle to stop the executions
and free the convicted persons. This was because Decree 2 of 1987 (authorising detentions
without trial) and Decree 55 of 1992 (establishing the military tribunal that convicted the
relevant persons) clearly ousted the court’s jurisdiction to inquire into the matter. The only
way the court could have assumed jurisdiction under the prevalent mode of legal reasoning
in Nigeria was for the NGO to deploy the Charter, which had been incorporated into
Nigerian law, and then approach the Commission in the way it did. The court regarded the
Chapter 10 of the Laws of Nigeria 1990, which had incorporated the Charter into Nigerian
law as a ‘decree with a difference’ and a ‘decree with international flavour’. In the court’s
view, Chapter 10 is deemed to be a decree under Nigerian law and binds the Nigerian
government as long as it remains a part of the OAU system. In that case, since Chapter 10
(on the one hand) and Decrees 55 of 1992 and 2 of 1987 (on the one hand) stand in conflict,
the court decided to rely on the particular legal instrument that preserved its jurisdiction
(as against the ones that ousted such jurisdiction). The court then relied on Chapter 10
(the legal instrument that incorporated the Charter into Nigerian law. But the court
could not have granted the injunction if the CRP had not approached it with a request
for that relief. For Nigerian courts do not act suo motu, that is, of their own motion.
And the CRP would have stood on much shakier ground had they not approached the
court with an interim measure indicated by the Commission. For no matter how
progressive a Nigerian Judge is, they are usually committed to a kind of legalistic mode of
reasoning and need to be offered a cogent legal argument on which to found their
decision. The stronger the argument appears to the court, the greater the chance of
success. This is especially so when the anticipated decision would be novel, challenging

to the government of the day, and directed at the decision of a strong military
government. In the end, the interim measure indicated by the Commission was also
the legal excuse needed by the court to act in the way it did and yet remain relatively
secure in an atmosphere where the judiciary was already under siege from the military
government. It could always claim to be bound by the legal logic that was set up when
the CRP approached the African Commission and obtained the indication of interim
measures. And this argument was eminently plausible given that Section 1 of Chapter
10 demands that all the state institutions of Nigeria comply with the provisions of
the Charter – the very document that establishes and empowers the Commission. It
was in this context, as well as in the more general context of socio-political
struggle that the CRP creatively deployed the Charter, the Commission, the Nigerian
courts and the mass media as resources in its much successful struggle to actualise
the rights of seven citizens of Nigeria and save them from the gallows. It was in
this sense that two institutions of the African system, the African Commission and the
Charter, served as resources that ‘added value’ to and expanded the range of, the
arguments and strategies available to the CRP. This IHI, the African system,
empowered the relevant NGO and tipped the balance of argumentative/discursive force
in its favour. Though the African system was reliant on the CRP and the network of
local popular forces at play here to transmit the system’s norms, values and knowledge
to the Nigerian courts, executive, and wider public, the favourable end result was
clearly attributable to the net effect of the African system’s operation and deployment
as a resource both without and within Nigeria.
The Newspapers Registration Decree No. 43 of 1993 Case:78 In 1993, the then military
government of Nigeria annulled the election on June 12 of that year of Moshood Abiola

as President of Nigeria. The mass media was vociferous in its condemnation of this action.
In response to the hostile posture of the mass media, the Babangida regime promulgated
Decree No.43 of 1993. This decree set out a number of extremely stringent conditions that
had to be met before a newspaper could lawfully operate in Nigeria. These conditions
included the payment of huge sums of money by newspaper publishers and fresh
registration of all newspapers circulating in Nigeria, which registration was to be
renewable at periodic intervals. Two Nigerian NGOs, Media Rights Agenda and the
Constitutional Rights Project collaborated and filed a communication at the African
Commission. The Commission held that the Decree violated several provisions of
the African Charter.
The collaborating NGOs then filed an action in the Lagos High court asking the court to
declare the Decree null and void. Part of the resources that these NGOs relied on in making
their case before the Nigerian courts and before the court of public opinion in Nigeria was
the decision of the African Commission. The court, per Humponu-Wusu, J dismissed the
preliminary objections of the military government and found for the NGOs. In dismissing
this objection, it held that since the African Charter was a part of our law vide Chapter 10
(which has the force of a decree), and since Chapter 10 conferred jurisdiction on the court
it had jurisdiction to try the case. The court also noted that any domestic legislation,
including Decree 43 of 1993, that was in conflict with the Charter was void to the
extent of that conflict.
It is important to note that following the decisions of the African Commission and the
Nigerian court, Decree 43 was very rarely (if at all) enforced by the military government,
and was soon repealed. It is a thing of regret though that the Press Council Decree No.60
of 1995 which contains some similar provisions was promulgated by the government on

the very day that Decree 43 was repealed. However, this later Decree has not been
enforced to date. The legal validity of this last Decree is currently being challenged in
the courts by Media Rights Agenda (MRA), and may soon be repealed by the National
Assembly.79
Here, it is important to note that the limited success that was enjoyed by the MRA and the
CRP in getting this Decree repealed was a result of the deployment of a number of resources
to that struggle: the Charter, the African Commission, the mass media and the courts. In
moves that bore a striking resemblance to those made in the Zamani Lekwot case, the
African Commission was approached by a network of NGOs and other popular forces
both as a way of strengthening the hands of a local judge, and as a way of ‘adding value’
to the operation and power of the legal arguments that they could make within Nigerian
courts. The African Commission ruled in the NGOs’ favour. The African Commission’s
decision was cited to the local high court judge. This judge then held in favour of the
NGOs that had brought the matter before it. All the while, a massive press campaign had
been waged to sensitise the public and embarrass the ruling military regime. A combination
of these measures worked (even if only partially in the last case).
Here again, we see evidence of the form of trans-judicial communication that has been
created and facilitated through the ingenuity and hard work of local NGOs and other
popular forces in Nigeria. Here the communication was trans-judicial because norms,
knowledge, information, legal logic and normative energy travelled some distance
between a quasi-judicial international institution and various institutions within
the target nation-state. In this case, it has travelled to the courts and executives of the
targeted state, Nigeria. But this was not a direct form of communication. Rather it was
a mediated form of communication, one that was creatively initiated, brokered,

transmitted, oiled and serviced by local NGOs and their partners. This form of transjudicial communication has also been both two-pronged and monist – in the sense
that the relevant NGOs have used both the international and the domestic fora
almost in the same uninterrupted movement.

The African System’s Influence on Executive Action and Behaviour in Nigeria
Even though the influence that the African system (and of the broader virtual to which
it belongs) has had on the Executive branch of government, and on executive action
within Nigeria, has been less marked and much perhaps more modest than that
system’s corresponding impact on judicial decision-making and action within Nigeria,
it has been significant nevertheless. Here the argument is that the African system has
been a key part of a virtual human rights network (that included local human rights NGOs,
activist lawyers, the independent press and activist judges) that has exerted a significant, if
modest, level of influence on executive action within Nigeria. Here again, the argument is
not that the African system’s efforts ‘caused’ the observed behaviour in the same way that
a twist to the hand causes pain. The overarching point that will be demonstrated is that the
system’s efforts have (in various ways and senses) helped to foster a significant and
valuable level of ‘correspondence’ between the behaviour of the executive branch
within Nigeria (on the one hand), and the goals and norms of the system itself
(including the decisions and resolutions that have emanated from that institution) on the
other hand. In each case, the system’s efforts were invigorated, complemented and
facilitated by the work of its virtual network partners. But the system’s own efforts were
often as important as the work of these partners.80

A couple of examples (taken from a far more extensive collection of evidence) will
serve to illustrate this point.

Modification of Legislation: Under the Nigerian military, the Executive branch was for all
their years in power an integral part of, and indeed controlled, the legislature. That is partly
why such military regimes were considered to be more or less dictatorial in nature. Given
the nature of this governance architecture, legislative action was also, in effect, executive
action. Legislative action could not, and did not, proceed except with the approval of the
Executive. It is for this reason that I consider the changes that were made to the Decrees
of the military government, in order to bring them in line with some of the relevant decisions
and resolutions of the African Commission, to be both legislative and executive action at
one and the same time. These changes are discussed as part of my consideration of the
influence of the African system within Nigeria’s legislative processes. But suffice it to
note here that certain decisions and resolutions of the African system did generate some
‘correspondence’ within the Nigerian legal order – in the sense that executive action was
in fact significantly influenced by these decisions and resolutions.

Suspensions of Trials and Executions: At its second extraordinary session held in
Uganda in December 1995, just after the Nigerian government had executed the Ogoni
9 (among the first batch of those that had been tried), the African Commission decided
to ask the Chairperson of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary General
of the same body to ‘express to the Nigerian authorities that no irreparable prejudice is
caused to the 19 Ogoni detainees whose trial is pending’.81This indication of interim
measures was in fact transmitted to the Nigerian government, and followed up with an

on-site investigative mission. The proposed trial of the Ogoni 19 (second batch) was
stayed, and they were later released without a trial being held. Now, it would be
implausible to argue that the trial of these detainees was stayed only because of the
Commission’s indication of interim measures. A number of other factors were clearly
at play as well. There had been a massive international outcry over the execution of
the trial and execution of the first batch of the Ogoni detainees, local NGOs and
the press had made a lot of fuss about the matter, Nigeria had been clearly
embarrassed by its strong condemnation in public by South Africa and Zimbabwe (a
treatment that is usually reserved for the very worst cases within the Organization of
African States, and even then rarely meted out). Nigeria had also been expelled from
the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear from an analysis of the
events surrounding this matter that in a psychological sense, the condemnations by
the African leaders and by the Commission seemed to hurt the regime’s moral
composure much more than those of other international entities whose actions could
easily be dismissed in post-colonial Nigeria as improperly motivated. The
condemnations of the African Commission and other African states were not as easy
to dismiss.82 In any case, the indication of interim measures by the Commission was
clearly one of the factors weighed by the regime in arriving at its decision to stay
the trials of the Ogoni 19. And incontrovertibly, it contributed significantly to the
generation of ‘correspondence’ with its goals exhibited by the behaviour in this case
of the Executive branch of government in Nigeria.
In the Zamani Lekwot case, the Commission’s indication of interim measures was also
deployed within Nigeria by the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), a local NGO, in a way
that led to the suspension of the execution of the General Lekwot and other leaders of the

Kataf ethnic group, and later on to the commutation of their death sentences to five-year jail
terms and eventual release by the Babangida-led military regime. This case has already
been discussed at length. Suffice it to say that given the fact that the release of General
Lekwot et al. was in fact ordered by the Executive, then it is reasonable to conclude that
the Executive was markedly influenced, albeit indirectly, by the efforts made by the
Commission, a part of the African system. Further evidence for the fact that the
Commission’s views and pressure played a significant role in producing the desired
outcome could be obtained from the fact that the Commission took a very active interest
in the end-results of its decision in this case, and even took the file with it to Nigeria
during its on-site investigative trip to that country.83 In any case, ‘correspondence’ was
produced between the decision of the Commission and the actions of the Executive
within Nigeria.
It is noteworthy as well that the argument that has been made here is not that
‘correspondence’ occurs automatically, or that the African system’s views are in all cases
‘complied with’ by the Executive. In fact, in Communication 87/93, the interim
measures that had been indicated by the Commission against the execution of Ken
Saro-Wiwa and others pending the Commission’s consideration of the matter before
it, were ignored by the Abacha military regime. Instead, what has been urged is that a
valuable level of ‘correspondence’ is possible (outside the ‘compliance’ optic or
radar), and that this sort of phenomenon has in fact occurred in a significant number of
cases in the Nigerian context.

Release of Detainees: In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Wahab Akanmu
and others) v Nigeria, Communication No.60/91, 100 detainees who had been tried,

convicted and sentenced to death for armed robbery in accordance with the Armed
Robbery and Firearms Decree 1974, petitioned the African Commission, through the
Constitutional Rights Project (CRP). The Decree under which their trial proceeded made
no provision for an appeal from the conviction and/or sentence. The Commission found
that the Decree violated Article 7(1)(a) of the African Charter, and recommended
that the petitioners be compensated. Due to the efforts of the CRP who deployed the
Commission’s decisions in pressing the government to effect their release, all of the
detainees were eventually released.84 Again, in releasing the petitioners, the
government was not necessarily ‘complying’ directly with the decision of the
Commission. Nevertheless, the decision helped in a very significant way to produce
‘correspondence’ with the Commission’s views within Nigeria. In this way did the
Commission influence markedly although somewhat subtly and indirectly the actions of
the Executive branch of government in Nigeria. As well, in the Zamani Lekwot case, and
in the Ogoni 19 matter, a number of detainees were released in ways that suggest some
correspondence with the views of the Commission.
These cases have already been discussed above.

Non-Enforcement of Draconian Press Laws: In the Newspaper Registration Decree
Case (already discussed) the African Commission’s decision that the extant Decree
violated several provisions of the African Charter was relied upon by two Nigerian
human rights NGOs in their successful suit before a local High Court to declare

the Decree invalid. It was also a critical resource in their public debate with
government officials about the ‘justness’ of the Decree’s provisions. The net

effect of the Commission’s decisions and the work of its network partners on

this issue was that the Decree was never enforced by the Executive, and was
later repealed by a military legislative body dominated by the Executive. Clearly
therefore, the African system had in this case helped to produce a significant
and valuable level of ‘correspondence’ with its views on that Decree within
Nigeria.

The African System’s Influence on Legislative Action in Nigeria
Here, two examples from a much more extensive pool of evidence will suffice to illustrate
my arguments:

The Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act of 1987:85 This legislation was enacted by
the Babangida military regime in March 1987. It provided for the establishment of a
special tribunal to conduct the trial of persons charged with offences related to a
communal or civil disturbance. The tribunal was to be composed of a serving or retired
superior court judge as its chair, and four other members, ‘one of whom shall be a serving

member of the Armed Forces’.86 It also provided for the confirmation of the any
conviction or sentence passed by the tribunal by the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the
military junta that at that time ran the executive and legislative branches of government
in Nigeria.87 Thus, persons convicted and/or sentenced by the tribunal had no right of
appeal to another judicial body. As importantly, the Decree had also ousted the
supervisory powers of the High Courts over the proceedings of the tribunal.88
The membership on the tribunal of a serving member of the armed forces, and the
absence of a judicial right of appeal from the decisions of the tribunal were repeatedly

pilloried in very explicit terms in a number of decisions and resolutions issued by the
African Commission. In the Zamani Lekwot Case, the Commission found that both of
these features were clear violations of the African Charter.89
Similarly, in a number of decisions and resolutions, the Commission has pilloried and
declared ‘Charter-illegal’ the kind of ‘ouster clause’ that was contained in the relevant
Decree.90 At its second extraordinary session, primarily convened in order to deal with
the execution of the Ogoni 9 and with other aspects of the Ogoni matter, the Commission
also expressed similar concerns regarding the compatibility of this law with the African
Charter.91 These features of the Decree were also criticised at a number of other
international fora.92
On 5 June 1996, the then military government promulgated the Civil Disturbances

(Special Tribunal) (Amendment) Decree. This Decree removed the Armed Forces
member of the tribunal, and provided for the right of appeal to a Special Appeal tribunal.
This is an example of the ‘correspondence’ of legislative action with the views of the
Commission – views that had been explicitly and strongly opposed by Nigeria! It is not
plausible, really, to argue that these legislative provisions were changed by the military

because of a simple desire on their part to ‘comply’ with the views of the Commission.
There were a number of other internal political and social forces at work in this case.
What is clear, however, is that the repeated condemnation of these legislative features
by the Commission played a very critical role in producing such ‘correspondence’.
Having explicitly opposed the resolutions and decisions that first recommended the
repeal of these same legislative provisions, the Nigerian government was obviously
aware of the Commission’s views on the matter, and took them seriously enough to
respond so strongly in opposition thereto. In fact, in defence of the relevant decisions, the

Commission had to fend off a very determined Nigerian military regime that had charged
that the Commission had no power to interpret the Charter, or pronounce on the validity of
Nigerian laws.93 The Commission’s views on this matter was thus one of the critical
factors that operated on the mind of the regime as it considered what course of action
to take. In the end, it reached a decision that reflected the Commission’s
recommendations almost to the letter. It is not unreasonable therefore to deduce logically
that the Commission’s work was influential in this case.

The State Security (Detention of Persons) Act of 1984:94 This legislation was passed by
the Babangida military regime in 1984. It aimed to: ‘Empower the Federal Military
Government to detain persons for acts prejudicial to State Security for a period not
exceeding six months at a time, and to provide for a review of such detention’.95 This
Act was subsequently amended by the State Security (Detention of Persons)
(Amendment) (No.2) Decree No.14 of 1994. Passed into law by the Abacha
military regime, this Decree introduced a new section 2A into the existing Act that
precluded courts from issuing the writ of habeas corpus or any other such writ
aimed at the production in court or release from detention of any person detained
under the 1984 Act (formerly referred to as Decree 2 of 1984).
The African Commission specifically declared this Act (as amended) to be
‘Charterillegal’.96 Its prohibition of the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by
the courts clearly offends the guarantees of the right to liberty under the African Charter.
Similarly, the Act contained an ‘ouster clause’.97 The Commission has also
condemned this sort of clause as, inter alia, a violation of the Charter’s guarantee of the
right to a fair trial.98 On 7 June 1996, the Abacha military regime promulgated the State

Security (Detention of Persons) (Amendment) (No.2) (Repeal) Decree No. 18 of
1996. This last Decree repealed Decree 14 of 1994, thus restoring the legal capacity
of the courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus or the like so as to order the production
in court or release from detention of a person detained under the 1984 Act. In
addition, that military regime ordered a wholesale review of the cases of all those
detained under the Act. About 12 persons regained their freedom as a result of this
particular review.99
This is another example of the ways in which the Commission’s efforts helped to
produce a very valuable form of ‘correspondence’ between its decisions and the legislative
actions of the Nigerian military government. In consequence, these efforts also helped to
produce the same kind of ‘correspondence’ between the contents of a specific legislation
and the relevant views of the Commission. The Commission’s views were one of the
factors that operated on the minds of the military as it made these changes. This much
is deducible from the regime’s explicit and strong opposition to the decisions of the
Commission that had condemned the aspects of the legislation that it subsequently
altered to correspond with the Commission’s views. In any case, the then ruling Nigerian
military junta did almost exactly what the Commission preferred to be done. There is not
much room for reasonable doubt as to the fact that the Commission’s views influenced the
decision to change the offensive features of the relevant law.
In the foregoing section of the chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate the significant
but modest level of influence so far exerted by the African system on the thinking
and action of the judiciary, the executive and the legislature within Nigeria. What I
will attempt to do in the following sub-section is to discuss analytically the various
ways in which the African system has also exerted a significant amount of influence

on the strategies and activities of certain popular forces that have operated within
Nigeria.

The African System’s Influence on Popular Forces in Nigeria
Here, two telling sets of examples will suffice to illustrate my point.

Influence on the Work of NGOs, Activist Lawyers and Minority Rights Advocates:
Elsewhere in this section, I have argued that the African system has been of significant
influence on judicial, legislative and executive action within Nigeria. However, an
examination of the operations or mechanics by which such influence was exerted
reveals that the system was only able to work in the way it did largely because it
allowed itself to be mobilised and deployed in creative ways by various activist
groups that operated within Nigeria. Yet, in most cases, had the system not allowed
itself to be so mobilised, the said activists would not likely have achieved the results
that they did. This much is evident from our consideration of the Zamani Lekwot
and Newspaper Registration Decree cases. The system’s influence enabled them to
persuade the courts to take cases that would not have been taken under national
legislation; to proffer creative legal arguments; to launch legal manoeuvres that would
not have been possible otherwise100 and thereby persuade many courts to rule in their
favour,101 to persuade many in the discerning public to put pressure on the military
regime to act in the ways in which these activists desired, to justify preferred
interpretations of existing constitutional provisions,102 and to embarrass (and delegitimise) the military on many occasions, thereby helping to transform public
ideologies regarding the appropriateness of military rule and many of its characteristic
practices. In these ways did the system markedly facilitate, invigorate, and thus

influence, the work of these activist groups. It provided them with an invaluable resource
with which to circumvent some of the absolutist machinations and actions of the
ruling military dictatorships. It helped them very much to save a number of lives,
secure the freedom of many, and remain relevant to Nigerian political life. As such, the
African system was as useful to these popular forces as these popular forces were to the
African system.
As well, the Charter has featured very prominently in the ‘education’ campaigns of
many NGOs. For instance, Shelter Rights Initiative has produced a Manual on Gender
Rights Litigation and Protection Strategies that relies heavily on the African Charter.103
So do almost all of its other manuals.104 The Textbook for Human Rights Teaching in
Schools produced by Constitutional Rights Project is also as heavily indebted to the
text of the African Charter. And given the non-justiceability of the economic and social
rights provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, the Shelter Rights Initiative and SERAC
have had to rely almost entirely on the presence of such rights in the African Charter as
its basis for its legal and public advocacy for the implementation of such rights in
Nigeria.105
Most Nigerian NGOs send representatives to the sessions of the Commission, and benefit
thereby from knowledge of its jurisprudence, resolutions, decisions and processes.106
Influence on the Struggle for Press Freedom: All too often during the relevant period,
the relevant military regimes launched severe attacks on the freedom of the press
(including closures, arrests and detentions).107 To the eternal credit of activist
journalism in Nigeria, the extremely courageous and creative independent press
(made up of news magazines such as Tell and The News) fought gallantly against
such attempts to rein them in, and continued to publish, albeit in guerilla mode,

throughout the entire period of military rule in Nigeria. Indeed, these news magazines
soon gained so much in credibility among the mass population of Nigeria that they
became the de facto authoritative sources of information for most Nigerians, and saw
their circulation and profits soar exponentially. They still profit from the fruits of their
courage.
Part of the explanation for their success in maintaining their operations was their
membership of the virtual network that was formed around the locus of the African
system by activist elements in Nigeria. Independent Nigerian journalists took an active
role in affording wide publicity to the work of other activists that involved the deployment
of the African system. They themselves benefited tremendously (in terms of the
ideological orientation and legitimisation that was afforded them) from their relatively
constant contact or interaction with the African system, or with the activists that
deployed that system within Nigeria’s legal order. The system’s views reinforced
their own sense of ‘appropriateness’. It also helped to reinforce a similar sense of
appropriateness within the larger public, one that motivated a significant chunk of that
population to support and encourage the activist press. The Nigerian public voted
very clearly with their money, and sustained these activist publications throughout the
duration of military rule in Nigeria.108
As importantly, the African system proved to be a key resource for the legal and
political struggles waged by the activist press within Nigeria. It was a vital line of defence
that, while not always effective, often worked in significant ways. The African
Commission issued a number of decisions that were well publicised in Nigeria and which
offered much-needed normative justification and additional legitimisation to these activist
journalists as they risked their lives, families, livelihoods and financial investments in

their battle against military dictatorship in Nigeria. For instance, in Communication
No.102/ 93,109 the African Commission declared that: ‘The proscription of ‘The News’
[an activist magazine] thus constitutes a violation of Article 9 [African Charter]. Equally,
the seizure of 50,000 copies of ‘Tempo’ and ‘The News’ Magazine [is not] justified
in the face of Article 9 of the Charter’.110 Similar decisions were reached by the
Commission in Communication 152/96; Communication 128/94; Communication 224/98
(the Niran Malolu Case111). Even more remarkably, as noted already in the previous
discussion of the Newspaper Registration Decree case, the African common played a key
role in providing the normative justification and basis for the concurring decision of a
Nigerian court, as well as in the massive public awareness campaigns that ensured that
a very draconian anti-press law was never enforced, and was in fact repealed
eventually.
The foregoing paragraphs have shown that African system has had both direct and
indirect influence on the work of popular forces, as well as on the attitudes of the
public within Nigeria. It has done so mostly by consciously producing and affirming
resources that were then deployed domestically by popular forces. In the following
section, I will offer a couple of examples of the indications of the modest but significant
influence that the African system has also exerted within other African states apart from
Nigeria. This will serve to highlight the potential generalisability within Africa of the
broad arguments advanced, and suggestions made, in this article.

Indications of the African System’s Influence within other African States
Here, I utilise examples from three countries in order to illustrate my point.

The Cases from Botswana: In the now famous decision in Attorney General of Botswana v
Unity Dow,112 the Court of Appeal of Botswana struck down a provision of the citizenship
law of that country that had in effect discriminated against women. In response to this
decision, the government of Botswana eventually moved to amend the citizenship law in
issue so as to repeal the offensive provisions.113 In coming to its decision, the court of
Appeal made copious references to the African Charter (as well as a couple of other
such international instruments). The court felt able to rely on the Charter despite the
fact that that treaty had not been incorporated into Botswana’s domestic legal
order. The court was of the view that since ‘Botswana is a signatory’ and is ‘one of the
credible prime movers behind the promotion and supervision of the Charter’, domestic
legislation in Botswana should be interpreted so as not to conflict with that country’s
obligations under the Charter.114 The Charter was thus a very important factor that helped
to justify, complement and legitimate this court’s assault against the legislation and those
prevailing norms of Botswana’s society that were patriarchal. The Charter, and Botswana’s
participation at the forefront in the African system, clearly inspired the progressive
orientation and tone of this decision. And since the Court of Appeal’s decision was
eventually reflected in the impugned law, key as it was to the decision, the African
Charter cannot but be viewed as having exerted a significant level of influence, albeit
indirectly, on both legislative and executive action within Botswana. This indirect
influence was exerted on the executive because it was that branch of government
that moved to amend the impugned law. This indirect influence was also exerted on the
legislature because it agreed to change that law.
Botswana’s eventual reaction to a decision of the African Commission is as instructive. In

John K. Modise v Botswana,115 the Commission’s intervention in the matter of the repeated
deportation from 1978 to 1995 of one of the leaders of the opposition in Botswana, on the
grounds that he was a South African citizen, led to the concession on the part of the
government of a partial remedy for this opposition leader’s citizenship problems. The
government granted him a form of citizenship (citizenship by registration), which while it
was not as ample and beneficial as ‘citizenship by birth’ to which he seemed to be
entitled, it still left him a much better situation than he had been for the previous 17 years.
In all those years, he had been forced to live as a stateless person outside Botswana.

The Cases from the Republic of Benin: In the Developmental Associations case, the
Constitutional Court of Benin struck down a decree made by the Minister of the Interior
not merely because it was unconstitutional, but also because it was a violation of the
African Charter.116 In the Madame Bagri case, the Constitutional Court of Benin
applied the African Charter even though it reached the conclusion that the dismissal of
the aggrieved party was constitutional.117 As Viljoen has noted,118 the rapidly increasing
influence of the African system within Benin’s judicial order is also illustrated by the
exponential rise in the number of the decisions of that country’s Constitutional Court
that refer to the African Charter in part in order to legitimise their conclusions, as well
as by the equally exponential rise in the number of cases in which laws and/or actions
were found by this court to be unconstitutional, based in part on the application of the
African Charter. Of the four cases that were heard by this court in 1993, none applied
the Charter.119 Of the 14 cases that the same court decided in 1994 (the very next
year), seven applied the African Charter, leading to findings of unconstitutionality in all
but one of these seven cases!120

A Case from Ghana: In New Patriotic Party v IGP, Accra, a judge of the Supreme Court
of Ghana relied in part on the African Charter when it struck down the Ghana Public
Order Decree of 1972.121 Archer, C.J. underscored the important role played by the
African system in the court’s decision-making process when he stated that:

Ghana is a signatory of this African Charter and Member States of the Organisation of African
Unity and parties to the Charter are expected to recognize the rights, duties and freedoms
enshrined in the charter and to undertake to adopt legislative and other measures to give
effect to the rights and duties. I do not think the fact that Ghana has not passed specific
legislation to give effect to the Charter, [means] the Charter cannot be relied upon. On the
contrary, Article 21 of our Constitution has recognised the right to assembly mentioned in
article 11 of the African Charter.122

In this way was the African system relevant to judicial action in this case.
The sample evidence discussed above clearly indicates that to an extent that I consider
significant in the light the historical context, the African system has had an appreciable
impact on judicial thought and action within a number of other African states apart
from Nigeria. This impact has manifested itself in the incidences of ‘correspondence’
between domestic judicial, legislative and executive action within these states (on the
one hand) and the norms and goals of the African system (on the other hand).

Centering the Generation of ‘Correspondence’ in the Evaluation of the
Domestic Impact of IHIs123
The fact that, to date, the kinds of stories that have been told here relating to the African
system’s ability (without directly compelling or cajoling ‘compliance’) to generate

different kinds of ‘constructivist-type’ influence within Nigeria and a couple of other
African states actors have, for the most part, not been told or told in any significant detail
by observers of the African system is testimony to the extent to which the described
phenomenon, what I have styled ‘correspondence’, has been largely beyond the radar of
the conventional paradigm for assessing the domestic effect and impact of IHIs.124 I am
of course aware of a short reference to the Zamani Lekwot case in a recent paper by
Chidi Odinkalu, himself a widely acknowledged authority on the African system.125 But
as brilliant as this paper is, it does not deal with the phenomena discussed here either
in any detail or in the same way. Like this author, Odinkalu is, however, quite
appreciative of the fact that the conventional paradigm for evaluating the performance
of the African system is inadequate.
This conceptual and practical inadequacy is mostly due to the fact that paradigm does
not, for the most part, take into account the various creative ways in which local popular
forces (including human rights NGOs and other non-state actors) deploy and employ these
IHIs within states. To the results of the measure of ‘what these institutions can do to or for
local popular forces?’ the more holistic paradigm that I envisage would add the results
of the additional measure of ‘what can be done with these IHIs by the popular forces
that operate within states?’ Both types of ‘measures’, not merely the latter, must be in
place if we are to obtain a holistic and thus more complete picture of the performance
of any such institution. From the above analysis, it is pretty clear to me that, when
creatively utilised, even an IHI that is generally assessed as weak (especially when
viewed from a compliance-centred perspective) can still help make a significant difference
within states. At the very least, it is clear to me from my research so far that because of
the hard work and creativity of Nigerian and other African popular forces (mostly led

by local human rights NGOs), the African system has begun to help make a difference
within Nigeria and some other African states. And while the dividends that have been
yielded have been quite modest so far, they have at the same time been significant.
Thus, as the discussions in previous sections of this article suggest, when IHIs
(such as the African system) have mattered to the lives of ordinary people, it is not been
principally because of some kind of autonomous ability to coercively compel the
obedience of states and other relevant actors, or because of an ability a similar
capacity to generate the voluntary compliance of these actors, but primarily because
of their mediated capacity to help foster eventual transformations in the selfunderstandings and conceptions of interest held by key domestic institutions,
thereby influencing significantly the particular society’s sense of ‘appropriateness.’
This is an argument that is broadly ‘constructivist’ in nature.126 The same argument
suggests that centring the generation of ‘correspondence’ by IHIs (such as the
African system) is a better way of realistically evaluating and understanding the full
extent and significance of their broader effects within states. In the case of the
African system, its ability to generate ‘correspondence’ within Nigeria has been
most remarkable because it has translated into what I have referred to as the ‘ACHPR
phenomenon’.
For the sake of clarity, it is important to re-articulate what is meant by this last phrase.127
The ‘ACHPR phenomenon’ stands for the following: the deployment of a norm, value or
decision issuing from within the African system by a range of popular forces within a state
party (sometimes governed by a dictatorial military regime) in a way that more or less
results in a desired progressive outcome (without the state party responding necessarily
to any direct ‘order’ or ‘recommendation’ of the African system).

As has already been suggested in the first section, the existence and nature of this
phenomenon poses a significant problem for much IHI theory and conceptual writing.
This is largely because, so far at least, most of the theories of IHIs (already canvassed
in that section) do not offer an adequate explanation for the mediated ability of the
African system to, in virtual alliance with popular forces, exert influence outside the
compliance framework, and foster such significant if modest levels of generally noncoerced and non-cajoled influence within Nigeria.
As has also been noted previously, the ACHPR phenomenon provides yet another
indication of the broadly explanatory power and importance of constructivism with
regard to our understanding of the nature, work and the value of IHIs. This does not
mean, however, that the conventional version of constructivism totally and completely
explains the ACHPR Phenomenon. What is meant is that the broadly constructivist
(read quasi-constructivist) paradigm comes the closest to offering a convincing
explanation of how such a ‘weak’ IHI can, mostly without coercing or cajoling, exert
such a significant influence within a state party that was governed during the relevant
period by a dictatorial military regime.
Regrettably therefore, as has been argued already, while the quasi-constructivists (who
are still largely constructivist in approach) have offered an approach that comes extremely
close, none of the theories of international institutions has adequately explained the
ACHPR phenomenon. For one, the idea that the African system has had, and can have,
a modest but significant impact within a relatively powerful dictatorial state (as Nigeria
was at the relevant period) would, at least at first thought, be ‘shocking’ to many
commentators in this area. The literature widely regards the African system as the
weakest of the weak, the most problematic of all the IHIs (that is, when it is assessed

against the conventional compliance-centric barometers for assessing IHI effectiveness).
Moreover, the system’s most significant influence seems to have been within Nigeria,
one of the two most powerful and most influential states in Africa! Of even more
significance is the fact that Nigeria was controlled by a dictatorial regime during the
first 12 of the 14-year period in which this phenomenon was observed (1987 – 2001).
Realists and neo-realists, who are convinced that international institutions such as IHIs
can only be consequential when and only when powerful states work to enforce
institutional principles and norms, are farthest from offering an adequate explanation for
the ACHPR phenomenon. A realist would expect to find that the African system was
able to exert influence within Nigeria because of the supportive assertiveness of a
regional hegemon or the supportive projection of power by a number of strong states.
In fact, in view of the evidence so far available to us, it seems like the African system
has been able to exert the most influence within Nigeria, the state that could be best
described as the regional hegemon. The African system was able to exert influence
within this state not because of the projection of power by a strong state or a group of
strong states (Nigeria is widely regarded as one of the two most powerful African states),
but mostly in spite of the power projected by Nigeria. South Africa, the only other
regional power that could have exerted any appreciable amount of influence on or within
Nigeria was not even a participant in the African system until the year 2000 or so.
Moreover, the influence of strong states located outside the African continent was
never directed at getting Nigeria to comply with the decisions issued from within the
African system.
The neo-liberal approach also does not adequately explain the ACHPR phenomenon. A
neo-liberal would expect to find an effective or influential African system only when a

group of states find that it is in their rational self-interest to foster such a system. In
fact, for most of this period most African governments explicitly regarded the African
system’s work as against their rational self-interest. This notion of self-interest is in fact
one of the things that the African system has helped to re-shape, albeit with modest
results. In the context of Nigeria, the dictatorial military regime that ruled Nigeria for
all but two of the relevant years clearly regarded the African system and its work as
directed against their self-interest. As such, no institutional convergence of the perceived
self-interests of a number of rational egotistic state actors could have occurred.
The quasi-constructivists and the republican liberals (in that order) come the closest to
offering such an explanation, but even their respective approaches remain inadequate to
varying degrees. The republican liberal approach is much more inadequate (at least
in the present context) than the quasi-constructivist take. What I want to do now is to
concentrate on the inadequacy of the theoretical explanations of the republican liberals
and the existing quasi-constructivists: the two theoretical approaches that stand any
chance of explaining adequately the ‘ACHPR phenomenon’. I have (in chapter two of
my forthcoming book) discussed at some length the relevant major positions of these
two ‘schools’.
The major reason why the republican liberals thesis does not adequately explain the
ACHPR phenomenon is that it seems only designed to explain the impact of an IHI
within already (if newly/weakly) democratised states. As such republican liberals do not
really have any plausible explanation for significant IHI impact within a dictatorship.
They do in fact recognise that such an impact is possible but have not to this writer’s
knowledge grappled with this matter effectively. One possible reason for this is that
none of these scholars would seem to expect to see any significant exertion of influence

by a weak institution such as the African system within a dictatorial state such as
Nigeria of the relevant era. A related reason is the near confinement of the empirical
‘data’ on which their theoretical explanations are based to the European context.
Another reason is their focus on the perceived high rate of state compliance with the
European system as the key indicator of that system’s worth. These theorists do not
seem to notice, and certainly have not theorised, the possibility of highly significant
‘correspondence’ (attributable to the work of IHIs) occurring outside the compliancecentred optic. Thus, focused as they are on ‘compliance’, and oblivious as they seem
to be of these kinds of valuable ‘correspondence’, it is not surprising that their approach
founders to a significant degree when tested against the ACHPR phenomenon. During
most of the relevant period, very few states parties to the African system were ‘liberal
democracies’ in the sense in which most European states are so viewed. As such,
republican liberals, who do not expect to find effective IHIs in situations where a critical
mass of newer or weaker liberal democracies do not already exist, would not ordinarily
expect to find that the African system has exerted a significant level of influence within
Nigeria. It is principally for these reasons that I conclude that, important as it is, the
republican liberal approach, symbolised by the work of Andrew Moravcsik,128 is
incapable of explaining adequately the ACHPR phenomenon.
Some conventional forms of constructivism do come very close to offering convincing
explanations of this phenomenon. However, the tendency of some constructivists to treat
states as unitary actors, and their historical reluctance to treat these states as dis-aggregated
units has meant that scholars of this ilk have too often not paid sufficient attention to the
role that sub-state actors such as domestic popular forces and other ‘principled issue
networks’ have played in ensuring IHI effectiveness. Hence, it is fair to state that one of

the major contributions that quasi-constructivists have made to the constructivist
approach is to account more fully for the role of domestic popular forces and other
such sub-state actors in the functional successes of IHIs. Another related reason for
the inability of conventional constructivism to fully explain the ACHPR phenomenon
is its historical tendency not to specify exactly how norms and ideas work to
influence thinking and behaviour within states. And yet, such a specification is
important for explaining the specific narratives that constitute the ACHPR phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the explanation for the ACHPR phenomenon that I have offered here is
still largely steeped in the broadly constructivist paradigm idiom and framework. It is
not at all anti-constructivism.
However, though quasi-constructivism is much more adequate in the present
connection, it is still not completely explanatory of the extant phenomenon. The quasiconstructivist approach is unable to explain the ACHPR phenomenon as adequately as
it could mostly because of the following reasons. Firstly, quasi-constructivists tend to
stress too much the leadership of the critical ‘issue networks’ or ‘advocacy networks’
by foreign (or so-called ‘international’) NGOs.129 While they regard local NGOs as
important, they still place far too much emphasis on what foreign agents can do for
local NGOs and other popular forces. The extent to which many quasi-constructivists
emphasise the foreign element is, in the case of the ACHPR phenomenon at least, not
supported by the bulk of the evidence. This level of stress is not explanatory in the
Nigerian case. There is very little evidence to suggest that international human rights
NGOs have paid more attention to Nigeria than they did to other African states. There
is very little evidence as well to suggest that it was primarily because international
human rights NGOs and charities paid more attention to Nigeria than they did to other

African countries that Nigerian popular forces became so creative in deploying the
African system within the country’s institutions, and have now out-paced the local
NGOs in other African countries by far.130 Secondly, quasi-constructivists also stress
too much the role played by the coercive pressure that is often brought to bear on
recalcitrant states in bringing about the transformation of thinking and practice within
these of states.131 This is not explanatory of the process by which the African system
has been able to exert modest but highly significant levels of influence within
African states. The African system is not legally empowered, and not physically able,
to exert coercive pressure on African states. Also, in none of the scenarios described
above was coercive pressure decisive. Most of the valuable ‘correspondence’ that was
observable was generated with little explicit resort to coercive pressures, and occurred
outside the compliance framework. These are the two major problems with the quasiconstructivist approach as an adequate explanation of the ACHPR phenomenon.
However, their often implied contention that in the processes through which IHIs
exert influence domestically, relevant actors are seen to make detailed end-means
calculations is supported by the evidence of the ACHPR phenomenon. That contention
is thus partially explanatory of the conduct of certain key agents that helped foster the
Nigerian transformation (such as activist judges, activist local NGOs, activist lawyers
and activist journalists). For instance, in the Zamani Lekwot case, a local NGO (the
Constitutional Rights project (CRP), made a detailed end-means calculation that if it could
secure an indication of interim measures from the African Commission, and widely
publicise that decision, it might be able to secure an injunction from a local court in
Nigeria ordering the government to stay the executions of General Lekwot et al. This
injunction would not have been otherwise obtainable because the jurisdiction of local

courts to review the death sentences had been ousted already by a military decree.
This strategy worked quite well. In the same way, the activist judge, Onalaja J.,
calculated that he could safely rely on the indication of interim measures cited to him
in court by counsel for the CRP, and that he could ‘legally’ subvert the logic of the
ouster clause, thereby assuming jurisdiction over the matter in a manner that did not
appear too partisan or political. Activist journalists also calculated, quite correctly as it
turned out, that if they gave the ruling wide publicity, and given the play of politics at the
time, the then ruling military junta might feel sufficient moral and cultural pressure as
to refrain from approving the death warrants of the condemned persons. In fact, the ruling
military junta eventually commuted the death sentences to five-year terms. In each case, the
work of the African system was crucial in providing the normative influence on the
popular forces, the courts and the military regime that eventually led to the reprieve. In
the process, the prevalent understanding of the extent to which the military could
subvert the human rights of citizens through the prevalent strategy of inserting ‘ouster
clauses’ in its decrees was challenged, and the process of its de-legitimisation and
eventual reformulation was prodded on to a significant extent. By not executing General
Lekwot et al., and eventually releasing them from jail before the expiry of the term of
years to which they had been sentenced, the military junta that ruled Nigeria was in
fact acknowledging impliedly that the ouster of the court’s jurisdiction, which had
been justified impliedly as an act that had been done in the interest of national security
132

[because the condemned persons had supposedly participated in the mass murder of

‘settler’ ethnic Hausa-Fulani persons during a communal disturbance in Kaduna state
of Nigeria],133 was not such a serious national security matter as to justify the ousting
of the court’s jurisdiction. Had they felt it necessary, they would have, as they have

done on many occasions, issued a decree annulling the court’s order.134 They did no
such thing.
Quasi-constructivism is also explanatory in this case in another sense. As a largely
constructivist approach, it accepts the notion, so fundamental to the latter ‘school’, that
ideas, norms and knowledge play a fundamental role in international politics and in the
exertion of influence by IHIs within domestic settings. The ACHPR phenomenon is in
fact evidence for the proposition that ideas, norms and knowledge (non-material
factors) do play a fundamental role in the exertion of influence by IHIs within states.
In all of the examples that I offered in the third section, the ideational, normative, and
epistemic influences of the African system and its virtual network partners are
palpable. For instance, the African Commission’s negative views as to the
appropriateness of issues such as ouster clauses, military rule, the closure of newspaper
houses on security grounds, the arbitrary arrest of activists, and the status of the
charter within the legal orders of states parties have on occasion been directly or
indirectly influential within the domestic political and judicial institutions of certain
African states. Much of this is evident from the third section above.
Thus, with the two caveats already entered, it is my considered view that (in relative
terms) the best theoretical framework for explaining the ACHPR phenomenon is the
quasi-constructivist one. With less stress on the leadership roles of so-called
‘international (read western) NGOs’, and on the role of coercive pressure, this theoretical
approach seems to explain reasonably adequately the evidence that I have collectively
referred to in this article as constitutive of the ACHPR phenomenon.

This preferred explanation is that the African system was, in alliance with popular

forces that operate domestically, able to produce a significant and valuable level of
‘correspondence’ between its norms and decisions (on one hand) and the thought and
action of certain key institutions within certain African states (mostly outside the
‘compliance’ framework). This correspondence was produced not primarily because of
its ability to compel state compliance, or to generate the voluntary compliance of states
parties, but principally because of its capacity to contribute significantly to a process of
(small ‘i’) ideological transformation within certain of the key institutions that constitute
states parties. It has helped foster modest but highly significant changes in how key
domestic institutions think and act about key notions or aspects of governance. This is
the most viable way to think about and understand the African system. It is also, in my
view, likely to be the most viable way of imagining the work of IHIs more generally.
The question that then arises is: if the African system possesses this kind of mediated
‘constructivist-type’ capacity to make a modest difference within states, this ability to
generate valuable ‘correspondence’ even within a state that is governed by those
viewed as dictatorial forces, can that system be deployed with profit toward enhancing
efforts at peacebuilding within specific deeply fragmented African states? This will
form the subject of discussion in the next section.

Harnessing the African System and the ‘ACHPR Phenomenon’ for Peacebuilding
within African States
It is now well established that the restiveness of the sub-state groups that constitute
postcolonial African states have deeply fragmented these states.135 It is also fairly clear
that one of the most important challenges to peacebuilding on the African continent

has been the deeply fragmented nature of the societies that constitute these states,136
and the corresponding lack of effective arrangements and credible fora for the
accommodation of the fears and interests of relevant sub-state groups vis-à-vis the states
of which they are a part.137 As such, it is only reasonable to deduce that peacebuilding
thinking and action in many parts of Africa has been significantly challenged and
hindered by the failure to address effectively the question of this kind of deep
fragmentation – a phenomenon that is at the root of far too many intra-state
conflicts in Africa.138 For, if the deepest fears and concerns of relevant sub-state
groups regarding the structural and distributive fairness of their relationships with
each other, and with their englobing state, is left largely unresolved at the end of
one conflict, these fears and concerns will be sure to spawn further rounds of
violence.139
Until very recently, there had been very few inter-state wars in post-colonial Africa.140
Even today, the vast majority of the violent conflicts that occur on the African continent
are intra-state (rather than inter-state) in nature.141 This remarkable situation has been
attributed to the 1964 adoption of the uti possidetis principle by the Organization of
African Unity (OAU).142 This principle affirms the sanctity of the territorial borders
among the newly de-colonised African states. By adopting this principle, the OAU
sought to secure the freedom of the newly de-colonised African states, a situation that
could have been jeopardised by the massive inter-state tensions that could have resulted
from a wholesale re-configuration of international borders on the continent. While the
OAU has, relatively speaking, been quite successful in achieving that specific objective,
their strict adherence to the uti possidetis principle did not really prevent all kinds of
violent conflicts on the continent. As is common knowledge, far too many intra-state

conflicts have occurred on the continent. This relative prevalence on the continent of
conflicts that occur within, rather than across, international frontiers has, in part at least,
been attributed to the extreme restiveness of the sub-state groups that are englobed by
Africa’s international borders. It is this same restiveness that has deeply fragmented
most African states. This is not surprising, given the coercive character of nineteenth–
twentieth century history of state-building in Africa.143 For, were not post-colonial
African states forcibly contrived by external colonial powers over so short a period,
and with very little time to ‘age in the wood’?144 Were not these sub-state groups
herded into these newly constructed states largely against their will?145 Did not the
colonial African state lack so much in internal legitimacy? Was not the post-colonial
African state its uncritical successor?146
Given this deeply fragmented nature of the post-colonial African state, it is not at all
surprising that most of these states are host to multitudes of aggrieved and discontented
sub-state groups. What is somewhat surprising is that in view of the centrality of this
problem to the very survival of many African states, it has not been addressed much
more effectively by state-builders in Africa. Past efforts at addressing this serious
problem have largely been half-hearted at best, and dismissive of the problem at worst.
Similarly, this structural affliction of the post-colonial African state has not received as
adequate a treatment as it deserves in the burgeoning contemporary peacebuilding
literature. It has not been as widely recognised as it should be in that body of literature
that, in the long term, there can be no truly successful peacebuilding within many postcolonial African states as long as the deepest structural fears and concerns of
aggrieved substate groups are not effectively addressed. These groups are after all the
building blocks of the post-colonial African state.

Much more effective third-party mechanisms, that are not completely dominated by the
very states that stand indicted by these groups, need to be constructed if these structural
fears and concerns are to be re-directed from their frustrated expression in violent gestures
and activity, toward their ventilation and expression in more peaceable ways. The reason
that these mechanisms can no longer be exclusively domestic in character is that, all too
often, the state itself and its judicial institutions are themselves implicated in either the
repression of these aggrieved groups, or in the unfair treatment complained of. Thus, to
install the relevant state or its judicial institution as the exclusive arbiter of the grievances
of its sub-state groups is to ensure that the very arbitral process will likely be viewed as
lacking in credibility by the very sub-state groups whose concerns are to be addressed.
This is the reason for some kind of ‘third party’ or ‘external’ participation in the
process. But ‘third party’ or ‘external’ does not always have to signify ‘non-African’.
On the one hand, the immune reaction of many African societies to international
intervention is now well documented.147 On the other hand, multilateral intervention
by inter-African bodies is often better received.148 As such, much more credible interAfrican institutions must have an important role to play in any efforts to provide
alternative normative energies, process and argumentative resources that significantly
expand the capacity of aggrieved sub-state groups to ventilate and seek redress in more
peaceable ways.
One such relatively more credible inter-African institution is the African system for
the protection of human and peoples’ rights. That system, especially one of its key
institutions – the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – could serve
as a very useful resource in the process of peacebuilding within many African states. I
have already argued in the third section of this article that despite its many

problems, this body remains very relevant as a crucial resource for human rights and
other state-building work in Africa. Even though it has not itself done nearly as much as
it ought to, and even though it has not, and never will, attain a status similar to the fabled
Delphic oracle, a lot has been done with it within the domestic order of Nigeria and a few
other African states.

And a lot can still be done with it there and elsewhere. If strengthened, the African
Commission can provide a relatively more credible third-party forum where
oppressed or aggrieved groups can seek redress without resorting to expressive
violence (an action taken in order to secure serious attention to their often deeply felt
grievances).149 The African Commission would thus provide a credible third party
alternative to the arbitration of these grievances within the domestic judicial orders of
affected African states. This is not to say that the domestic systems of such states
should no longer deal with such grievances. Jennifer Widner has, for instance, noted
the important, if limited, roles that domestic judicial institutions can sometimes play
in peacebuilding within African states.150 The point is that these groups ought to have
a more credible alternative in the not unlikely event that they (with good reasons)
perceive domestic institutions as biased and lacking in credibility. This form of
third party arbitration will also provide a certain amount of much needed strategic
space within which these aggrieved sub-state groups (and other concerned popular
forces) can creatively mobilise with profit. This rather optimistic view of the capacity
of the African system to lend itself to the amelioration of internal state-building (and
therefore peacebuilding) problems within some African countries is not speculative, for
the most part. For as was demonstrated by the discussion in the third section above of the

Zamani Lekwot case, a Nigerian human rights NGO was able to use the African
Commission and Charter in creative ways in order to secure the lives and freedoms of
seven top leaders of the Kataf minority sub-state group of Nigeria. These leaders
might have been executed but for the interim measures indicated by the African
Commission and the other resources that were mobilised by this NGO. Had these
leaders been executed, the already deep-seated resentment of the Nigerian state widely
held among Nigeria’s minority groups might have been greatly exacerbated.151 And
given the relevant ethnic group’s history of agitation against the Nigerian state, that
situation could have ultimately led to continuing, if localised, civil disturbances in that
volatile part of Nigeria.152
Another way in which the African Commission can contribute to the amelioration of the
restiveness of sub-state groups within many African states – a desideratum for successful
peacebuilding within the affected states – is through its efforts to generate normative
reasoning that can help, directly or indirectly, to configure the human rights environment
within these states, and even affect the nature of the process of re-configuring the
relationships among such groups and their states. Such normative reasoning can often
be mobilised with profit within domestic courts and other fora. This was the case in the
Zamani Lekwot Case (where the African Commission insisted on due process been
followed in the trial of some leaders of the Kataf people), and in the Newspapers
Registration Case (where the African Commission insisted on the necessity for a free
press in Nigeria and suggested the repealing of an offensive press law). In the first case,
popular forces were able to mobilise the courts, the press and sections of the general
population using the African Commission’s decisions as legitimating and
empowering normative value. In the second case, popular forces were also able to

mobilise important institutions and segments of Nigerian society using the African
Commission’s decision as a legitimating and empowering normative text. In view of
the crucial role that the vibrant independent press has played in raising consciousness
about the grievances of that country’s sub-state groups, and in campaigning on behalf of
their leaders, this last case is particularly instructive as to the role that the African system
has played in the construction of a more conducive environment for the amelioration of
the grievances of sub-state groups in Nigeria. However, important as the foregoing
examples are, the normative logic of the African Commission in its landmark
decision in the Katanga Case is much more directly related to the ‘national
question’ that continues to challenge many African states.153

There, the African Commission held that an oppressed sub-state group had a right to
secede from its englobing state if it could show that the treatment meted out to
members of the group by the relevant state is so intolerable as to justify such a radical
measure, and that secession was the only real way to protect them from that state in the
longer term. This decision has important implications for the relationships among states
and their sub-state groups on the African continent. No longer can an African state deal
ruthlessly and oppressively with a sub-state group and yet demand that such a group
retain its membership in that state. The clear message that was sent out by the African
Commission is that if a state wants normative or legitimating support in an effort to
maintain its continued integral existence, then it must find relatively non-forcible and
nonoppressive ways of retaining the loyalty of its sub-state groups.
Yet another possible, and indeed probable, contribution of the African system to
longterm peacebuilding within African states could be its function as a general resource

for all kinds of work by popular forces (including human rights NGOs) within these
states. In Nigeria, the African system has been an important institutional and normative
resource for popular forces, even in the darkest months of the long years of military rule.
This much is evident from the discussion in the third section of this article. They enabled
creative and novel arguments to be urged in ways that would have been otherwise
impossible – a ‘value-added’ function. They made a significant difference indeed. In
this way did this institution contribute significantly to the struggle to foster a more
deeply embedded and sustainable culture of constraint within domestic state institutions.
Fostering such a culture of constraint is crucial if aggrieved sub-state groups (especially
power minorities) are to begin to view local judicial mechanisms as credible and capable
of addressing their fears and concerns. This is of course a long-term view of things. But
it is my considered view that effective peacebuilding in Africa cannot but include a
long-term perspective if we are to address the cyclical periodic flashes of violence that
characterise many African states. Clearly such cyclical outbreaks of violent conflict reflect
a deeper and more rooted malaise.

Summarising the Implied Recommendations and a Future Research Agenda
Implied in the discussions and analysis conducted in the previous sections of this article
are six recommendations for future action.

1. That quasi-constructivism apart, pre-existing theories of, and frameworks for
understanding, IHIs (like the African system) need varying levels and various kinds
of re-orientation and enlargement in order to capture the myriad ways, that lie
outside the compliance-centred radar/optic, in which IHIs can matter within domestic

socio-political and legal orders. A more holistic paradigm is needed for evaluating
IHIs if we are not to miss out on important phenomena such as (a) the ‘correspondence’
that is fostered by IHIs in virtual network alliance with domestic popular forces – and
outside the compliance-centred radar, and (b) the generation of such ‘correspondence’
within a state that was widely regarded as governed by dictatorial forces during
the relevant period by an IHI that is viewed as weak (the ACHPR phenomenon).
Observers of the African system need to begin to apply more seriously this kind of
enlarged paradigm and optic if they are to render more adequate accounts of both
the possibilities and impossibilities that lie within that system.
2. That more attention be paid by peacebuilding theorists and practitioners to the
fundamental structural problems that confront African states, especially the restiveness
of the building blocks that make up these states. More attention needs to be paid to
addressing their fears and concerns, and loosening up the stranglehold of many states
on their sub-state groups. Alternatives to violence need to be harnessed (if already
existing), and put in place (if non-existent). Without this happening, peacebuilding
efforts in Africa shall remain ever so structurally challenged. More such attention
also needs to be paid to the various creative ways in which popular forces might
deploy the African system’s mediated capacity to generate ‘correspondence’ in ways
that serve peacebuilding thought and action in Africa.
3. The African system needs to be greatly strengthened to continue to act as it has as a
resource for the work that popular forces do in Africa. It should be made even more
active, more widely understood, and much more financially viable if a lot more can
be done with it in a lot more countries.
4. States should be encouraged to incorporate the African Charter as part of their domestic

law. This is not simply a mere formalist concern. Without the incorporation of this
Charter in 1983 as an integral part of Nigerian law, the African system would not
have had as much impact within Nigeria. For one, it would not be as widely noticed
as it has been. More importantly perhaps, it would have been far more difficult to
convince judges and bureaucrats to regard it as normative within Nigeria’s sociolegal order. It would have been too easily dismissed as largely irrelevant to the
workings of Nigeria’s domestic legal order.
5. Local popular forces (including many human rights NGOs) need to be greatly strengthened and supported. Without the courage, ingenuity, hard work and dedication of many
such groups, the African system would not have had much of an impact within Nigeria
(and most likely within other African states).
6. A Special Commission on National Minorities needs to be established by the OAU
(now known as the African Union). This special commission is necessary to draw
much more attention to ‘the national question’ (the question of relatively deep state
fragmentation) as perhaps one of the most important of the root causes of conflict in
Africa. The special commission is also needed because it is necessary to have a
highly specialised body composed of about three to five relatively detached and
eminent persons who can work from day to day on this question, seeking locally
viable solutions, harnessing scarce resources, exerting much needed influence,
addressing the pertinent concerns of many sub-state groups, and monitoring many
delicate situations that seem likely to spiral into violence.
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